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high the banner of privacy in Roth,zz a major obscenity decision of 
the Warren years, and Chime/ v. Ca/ifornia,zJ which narrowed the 
limits of warrantless searches incident to an arrest. But he reso-
lutely opposed the reapportionment revolution and was the lone dis-
senter in Flast v. Cohen,z4 where the Justices modified standing 
requirements and broadened the opportunities for taxpayers to con-
test government programs. He seldom appears to have met a mo-
nopolistic business corporation he didn't like.zs 
A lawyer's lawyer, it was appropriate that Harlan filled the 
seat occupied by Robert Jackson, another first-class advocate, litiga-
tor, and process-oriented jurist, whose occasional eloquence on be-
half of freedom of speech and liberty was exceeded only by his belief 
in conspiracies and his passion for order.26 But from the perspec-
tive of 1992 and the present Supreme Court, now packed with polit-
ical lackeys and intellectual harlots, even Jackson and Harlan have 
taken on the stature of devoted civil libertarians. One can only 
hope and pray that the Casey five continue to read the Harlan of 
Griswold and not the Harlan of Flemming. 
THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT. By Robert A. 
Burt.I Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1992. 
Pp. 454. $29.95. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen 2 
I 
The Constitution in Conflict is a disappointingly weak book 
about a powerful and important idea in constitutional law. The 
22. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). 
23. 395 u.s. 752 (1969). 
24. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). 
25. Harlan's principal clients at Root, Clark, Buckner & Howland prior to his judicial 
appointments had included American Telephone and Telegraph, Western Electric, Interna-
tional Telephone and Telegraph, the Gillette Safety Razor Company, American Optical and 
DuPont. He represented the latter in their unsuccessful effon to maintain a dominant finan-
cial interest in General Motors, and when the Supreme Coun finally sustained the govern-
ment's Clayton Act complaint, he recused himself, but later denounced Justice Brennan's 
opinion for its "superficial understanding of a really impressive record." The record, of 
course, had been one he helped to prepare at Root, Clark. 
26. Compare Jackson in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943), 
with Jackson in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), or Kunz v. New York, 340 
u.s. 290 (1951). 
I. Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale University. 
2. Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School. My thanks to 
Michael Socarras, Ron Wright and Chip Lupu for their helpful comments. 
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idea is that, contrary to today's conventional wisdom, the Supreme 
Court is not the sole or even final interpreter of the Constitution. 
Rather, the power to interpret the Constitution is a shared power of 
all three branches of the national government-Congress and the 
President, as well as the courts-and that these branches are co-
equal with one another in the exercise of that power. The power of 
the idea lies in its claim that ours is not a system of judicial 
supremacy, with the Supreme Court having the final word on all 
constitutional issues, but a system of constitutional supremacy ac-
complished through the structural separation of powers, with each 
branch exercising independent, coordinate review over the constitu-
tional judgments of the others. 
This idea is not new. Indeed, there is a strong argument that 
this was the original vision of the Framers. This theory has repeat-
edly emerged at important junctures in our constitutional history as 
a counterweight to progressively more aggressive assertions of judi-
cial supremacy and power by the federal courts. Historically, the 
idea that interpretation is a power shared among independent, co-
equal branches has been voiced by such prominent figures as 
Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln and Frank-
lin Roosevelt. This view was featured prominently in a controver-
sial speech by Attorney General Edwin Meese in 1986 that sparked 
a new wave of interest in the question of executive branch "nonac-
quiescence" in Supreme Court precedents, including an issue-length 
symposium in the Tulane Law Review.3 
The book jacket reviews of The Constitution in Conflict lead the 
reader to expect a defense of the "shared power" view from an un-
likely source-Yale Law School Professor Robert Burt, a noted ac-
ademic liberal known chiefly for his work in the areas of family law, 
medicine and psychiatry.4 The inside flap advertises the book as 
one defending that idea "that the Constitution could be interpreted 
by any of the three branches of the government" and rehabilitating 
the idea of "equal interpretive power" as a legitimate, indeed pre-
ferred, rival to judicial supremacy. Professor Sanford Levison 
raves: "The Constitution in Conflict presents a well-thought-out at-
tack on the standard notion of judicial supremacy that views the 
Supreme Court as the 'sole' or even 'ultimate' interpreter of the 
Constitution." 
Such a book might well have been highly interesting. But 
3. 61 Tulane L. Rev. 977 (1987). 
4. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Taking Care of Strangers: The Rule of Law in Doctor-
Patient Relations (Free Press, 1979); Robert A. Burt, The Constitution of the Family, 1979 S. 
Ct. Rev. 329 (1979). 
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those who come to this book expecting a thorough and systematic 
investigation of the idea of coordinate and co-equal interpretive 
power will be sorely disappointed. In Professor Burt's hands, the 
idea of shared interpretive authority is a throwaway line that has 
little to do with Burt's real thesis, which is decidedly less interest-
ing: The Supreme Court, Burt argues, should exercise its authority 
in a less authoritarian-and, by implication, less authoritative-
way, fashioning compromises and intermediate solutions rather 
than hard-and-fast answers. The Court should be careful not to get 
too far out in front of public opinion; it must modulate its decisions 
to take into account public perceptions and the need for its deci-
sions to gain acceptance. It must also help the parties to appreciate 
the other side's position. The effect of its decisions should be "pac-
ification," not "provocation." The Court should decide cases so 
that nobody goes away too happy or too unhappy, to the end that 
nobody goes away and that the contending factions are forced to 
continue in "dialogue" with each other. Neither party should be 
able to take a judicial decision and lord it over their litigation oppo-
nents, lest the losing party feel too "subjugated" (a too-trendy aca-
demic word that Burt hackneys at a rate of once every other page). 
A typical Burt passage captures the flavor of the entire book: 
"Though it is obviously preferable that all disputants be equally 
happy with the outcome and with one another, the equality princi-
ple remains viable if everyone is equally unhappy." 
This is a tired thesis-warmed over Alexander Bickel but with-
out the grace or sophistication. With Burt, the point is also more 
social history than law. He labors to develop his view through a 
long and meandering tour through some of the more interesting 
events in the Supreme Court's history: Marbury v. Madison and the 
Marshall Court's early conflicts with Presidents Jefferson and Jack-
son; slavery and the Civil War; economic substantive due process in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; the New Deal re-
alignment; Brown v. Board of Education, Cooper v. Aaron and the 
battle over segregation; and today's raging disputes over capital 
punishment, abortion and affirmative action. 
Sometimes Burt becomes so interested in what he is saying 
about particular cases or epochs in the Court's history that he (and 
the reader with him) loses track of the main contour of his argu-
ment. These lengthy digressions are almost welcome, though, for 
when Burt seeks to squeeze all the lessons of legal history into his 
thesis, the book wallows in overwrought sentimentalism: 
In all these instances, the Court not only dismissed the possibility 
that contending parties on their own might reach a peaceable ac-
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commodation but, more fundamentally, the Court rejected the 
goal of accommodation and agreed with those among the antago-
nists who defined their struggle as necessarily requiring the utter 
subjugation of their opponents. 
The theme is constantly repeated, with Burt collating previous is-
sue-discussions as he goes along. By the time we make it to abor-
tion, for example, Burt writes as follows: 
[F]or abortion restrictions, as for race segregation in Brown, for 
economic relations in Lochner, for territorial slavery in Dred 
Scott, for federal-state relations in McCulloch-a Court may 
properly overturn the coercive imposition because of its inherent 
inequality, but only to impose an equal status of stalemate on the 
adversaries, not to end the conflict, not to seize victory from one 
and award it to the other. 
But the most unfortunate aspect of The Constitution in Conflict 
is not the staleness of the thesis and its presentation, but the fact 
that Burt's approach seems to have no formal role for the legal cor-
rectness of one or the other party's claims. To be sure, Burt has 
views about who has the politically better position and here he 
pretty much follows the traditional liberal line. He is pro-New 
Deal, anti-segregation, pro-abortion, anti-capital punishment. But 
nowhere does the legal (or moral) correctness of a party's position 
play a very important part in Burt's theory of how the Supreme 
Court should resolve disputes. There is nothing remotely approach-
ing traditional legal analysis of the issues Burt addresses, and thus 
no serious discussion of the possibility that one or the other position 
might be right or wrong as a matter of law. Legal disputes are seen 
as simple political or social disputes. Everything is an "issue." And 
when the Supreme Court decides an issue, its goal should be to cre-
ate dialogue and accommodation. There are no absolutes. All 
claims not to be subjugated are created equal. Anything and every-
thing can be compromised, even the most important principles of 
the Constitution. 
Thus, Burt treats the right of white Southerners not to be sub-
jugated by the North on a level of moral equivalence, with the right 
of blacks not to be subjugated by their Southern white masters in 
the institution of slavery. (Seep. 198.) The vice of the Dred Scott 
case was not its constitutionalization of a property right in slaves 
and dehumanization of blacks but in its failure to strike a satisfac-
tory social compromise that preserved dialogue. (See pp. 186-99.) 
The beauty of the desegregation cases was not Brown I 's vindica-
tion of the rights of black schoolchildren, but Brown II's modera-
tion of the remedy, so that desegregation created dialogue with, 
1993] BOOK REVIEWS 225 
rather than subjugation of, the competing claims of white 
southerners to maintain Jim Crow. (See pp. 271-85, 293.) 
This is ridiculously obtuse. If the point on which the North 
seeks to "subjugate" the South is that the South cannot be permit-
ted to insist on slavery for the whole or secession for itself, then we 
must choose one "subjugation" over another. If desegregation 
"subjugates" white racist notions of how society should be organ-
ized, tough luck Bubba. Certain claims have a higher legal and 
moral status than others. Some claims and claimants should be un-
qualifiedly rejected. Burt's vision of justice and the Supreme 
Court's role is an intellectually and morally bankrupt one-splitting 
the difference between all disputants in the vain hope that they will 
then reconcile with each other, irrespective of the legal and moral 
merits of the parties' respective claims or the intransigence of their 
positions. It is not that Burt is completely agnostic about results-
he thinks the Court should push the parties in certain directions-
but that he is indifferent to legal principles as the means of deter-
mining results. He would prefer to have the Court attempt to man-
age conflict through a two-steps-forward-one-step-back dance that 
has more to do with psychology and "dialogue" than with decision 
according to legal rules. In short, for Burt, constitutional adjudica-
tion is group therapy, not law. 
Burt embraces this view for "all disputes which are so po-
larized that one party regards the other's victory as destructive of 
equal status and therefore intolerably oppressive" -that is, in prac-
tical terms, all disputes where the parties strongly assert that they 
are right and the other side is wrong. Apparently, the best litigation 
strategy for a party with an indefensible legal position is to stake out 
the most extreme and unreasonable position imaginable. Burt's 
Supreme Court will then act as a National Mediation Board that 
strives to split the difference between a correct legal position and an 
unreasonable one unreasonably maintained. 
Can one imagine what would happen if the Court actually were 
to behave in such a manner? 
II 
The April 1992 publication date of The Constitution in Conflict 
preceded by just a few weeks the announcement of the most signifi-
cant Supreme Court decision in decades, Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey. 5 The three Justices filing what has come to be known as the 
"joint opinion" in Casey-Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
5. 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992). 
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ter---doubtless did not read Professor Burt's book as they worked 
on their sixty-page opus on judicial authority and legitimacy. But 
their Casey opinion provides an interesting example, and test, of 
Burt's basic themes. For the joint opinion is near pure Burt-ism: In 
upholding the right to abortion created in Roe v. Wade against state 
laws that "unduly burden" that right, there is only the slightest 
of nods in the direction of traditional legal analysis. The weight of 
the discussion concerns the preservation and enhancement of judi-
cial authority, to the end that wise men and women exercising 
"reasoned judgment"6 might impose some sort of Grand Compro-
mise (or pseudo-compromise)7 that does not resolve an issue of con-
stitutional law but instead purports (to borrow Professor Burt's 
words) to "promote institutional interactions among the combat-
ants that might lead them toward future 'consultation and 
accommodation.' " 
The core of the Casey opinion is its reaffirmation of the "cen-
tral holding" of Roe v. Wade-that women have a constitutional 
right to abortion throughout pregnancy that may be made subject 
to certain incidental regulations, but that is effectively immune to 
actual government restriction.s The majority opinion does not con-
tend that this result is correct as a matter of constitutional first prin-
ciples, but merely that it should be adhered to as a matter of 
precedent, "whether or not mistaken. "9 The ground Casey defends 
is not principle, but the Court's own power: by its own admission, 
the Court attached unusual importance to the doctrine of stare deci-
sis for the sake of preserving its institutional position as chief expos-
itor of the Constitution, accepted by the people as such.w That 
6. Id. at 2806 ("[A]djudication of substantive due process claims may call upon the 
Court ... to exercise that same capacity which by tradition courts have always exercised: 
reasoned judgment."). 
7. Professor Burt correctly recognizes what the Court in Casey did not, that its "com-
promise" over abortion is a lopsided one in favor of the pro-abortion position: "As Roe v. 
Wade was actually decided in 1973, however, the Court awarded total victory to one troop 
among the combatants." Casey tinkers with, but does not meaningfully alter, the terms of 
Roe. See infra n.8. 
8. The majority's characterization of its ruling as retaining the essentials of Roe is 
undeniably accurate. The aspects of the Pennsylvania statute upheld by the Court do not 
actually prevent women from obtaining abortions; they present procedural obstacles only. 
The Court made clear that it would strike down procedural obstacles that meaningfully re-
strict access to abortion. Actual substantive prohibitions on some abortions plainly would be 
struck down under the Court's reasoning. In practical operation, there are only slight ditfer-
ences between the "strict scrutiny" of abortion regulations in Roe and the "undue burden" 
test of Casey. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent is surely mistaken in its assertion that Casey 
retains but "the outer shell" of Roe but "beats a wholesale retreat from the substance of that 
case." 112 S. Ct. at 2855 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Casey maintains the substance and 
makes slight alterations in the outer shell. 
9. 112 S. Ct. at 2810. 
10. Id. at 2814 ("Our analysis would not be complete, however, without explaining why 
1993] BOOK REVIEWS 227 
acceptance, the Court said, would be threatened were it to overrule 
Roe v. Wade, because of the acceptance Roe has obtained (at least in 
some quarters) and because of the possibility that the Court would 
be perceived as succumbing to political pressure -"overrul[ing] 
under fire" 11-were it to do so. 
One may rightly question (as did Justice Scalia's dissent), the 
accuracy of the majority's realpolitik assessment, 12 and may also 
question (as did Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent), whether the 
Court might not as easily be perceived as succumbing to political 
pressure in reaffirming Roe rather than overruling it.1J But the 
truly extraordinary aspect of the majority's discussion is the sugges-
tion that politics or perceptions should play any role at all in the 
Court's decisional calculus, with respect to the doctrine of stare de-
cisis or any other matter. The Court's "legitimacy", the majority 
wrote, is "a product of substance and perception."14 The success of 
the Court in maintaining real or perceived legitimacy is determined 
by the "people's acceptance" of the Court's decisions.ls Accord-
ingly, the Court "must take care to speak and act in ways that allow 
people to accept its decisions on the terms the Court claims for 
them .... "16 Those claims should, of course, be "principled," or at 
least "grounded truly in principle."17 Thus, the majority concludes, 
overruling Roe's central holding ... would seriously weaken the Court's capacity to exercise 
the judicial power and to function as the Supreme Court of a Nation dedicated to the rule of 
law. To understand why this would be so, it is necessary to understand the source of this 
Court's authority, the conditions necessary for its preservation, and its relationship to the 
country's understanding of itself .... "); see also id. at 2816 ("If the Court's legitimacy should 
be undermined, then, so would the country be in its very ability to see itself through its 
constitutional ideals."). 
II. ld. at 2815. 
12. Id. at 2883 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Opinion polls consistently show that a majority 
of the public favors significant restrictions on abortion, the size of the majority depending on 
the nature of the restriction and, often, the way the question is framed. See, e.g., Abortion 
and Moral Beliefs (Am. Political Network, Mar. I, 1991). (Gallup Poll commissioned by 
Americans United for Life but conducted independently shows that substantial majorities of 
Americans disapprove of abortion in most circumstances under which it is currently per· 
formed); Boston Globe, Mar. 31, 1989 at I, col. I (national polls shows large majority (78%) 
of population opposes abortion in most circumstances, amounting to all but a tiny fraction of 
reasons cited by women having abortions, but 53% would allow abortions in those excep-
tional circumstances); The New York Times, Dec. I, 1987 (New York Times/CBS News poll 
showing similar results); USA Today, Jan. 2, 1990 at I, col. 6 (only 37% believe abortions 
should be left to a woman and her doctor, large majority favoring various degree of 
restrictions). 
13. 112 S. Ct. at 2865 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). 
14. ld. at 2814 (emphasis added). 
15. ld. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. The majority's understanding of what constitutes a principled justification for a 
holding, however, is quite ecumenical: "apposite legal principle" in constitutional cases con· 
sists of "the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal principle on which the Court draws." 
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"the Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled deci-
sions under circumstances in which their principled character is suf-
ficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation."Is 
The Court's discussion is dotted with euphonious references to 
"the rule of law" and "constitutional principle," but the boldness of 
its claim nonetheless comes through plainly: While social and polit-
ical pressures do not "as such" dictate how the Court decides cases, 
they nonetheless bear on how the decisions of the Court will be per-
ceived, and the Court must take those perceptions into account in 
order to maintain its legitimacy. If the Court's decisions should 
maintain a principled appearance (under broadly defined criteria), 
they need not-and cannot-rest on pure principle, especially if 
that principle suggests a politically controversial outcome. Rather, 
the outcome must be one that readily can be "accepted by the Na-
tion"; its legal justification need only be "sufficiently plausible to be 
[so] accepted." For the Casey majority, the Court's legitimacy de-
pends not on the legal correctness of its decisions, but on some com-
bination of legal plausibility and political acceptability. 
Casey continues: The Court "would almost certainly fail to re-
ceive the benefit of the doubt"I9 when overruling cases in two cir-
cumstances. The first is where the Court overrules too frequently: 
"There is a limit to the amount of error that can plausibly be im-
puted to prior courts."2o This proposition is doubtful as an empiri-
cal matter; a great deal of error plausibly may be ascribed to earlier 
decisions. If (as the Court recognizes) courts must be permitted to 
correct some errors on the theory that "two wrongs do not make a 
right," how is it that there can be, in principle, too much error cor-
rection-on the theory that "too many rights make a wrong"? 
What the majority probably means is that there is an increasing cost 
to overruling in terms of the Court's prestige-the currency with 
which the majority is chiefly concerned. So stated, the point seems 
sound as a logical matter, but it does not reflect well on the Court. 
This argument is probably posted as a defensive rear guard against 
criticism of O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter as being inconsistent 
for having voted to overrule numerous other cases. 
The second situation in which the majority feared losing the 
benefit of the public's doubt was the overruling of a highly contro-
versial, deeply divisive "watershed" case in which the Court had 
I d. The latter part of this formulation is, of course, circular. Apposite legal principle consists 
of those sources on which the Court chooses to draw (aside from the Constitution). 
18. ld. at 2814. 
19. Id. at 2815. 
20. ld. 
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earlier "staked its authority"z': 
Where ... the Court decides a case in such a way as to resolve 
the sort of intensely divisive controversy reflected in Roe and in 
those rare, comparable cases, its decision has a dimension that 
the resolution ofthe normal case does not carry. It is the dimen-
sion present whenever the Court's interpretation of the Constitu-
tion calls the contending sides of a national controversy to end 
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in 
the Constitution.22 
229 
In other words, it is precisely because of the controversial, 
deeply disputed nature of the Roe decision and the rare importance 
it has assumed in contemporary debate over the legitimacy of the 
Court that the majority felt it could not now back down, "whether 
or not mistaken" in the first instance.23 (This aspect of the majority 
opinion earned Justice Scalia's particular ire as "czarist arro-
gance."24) The Casey opinion treats the abortion issue as one on 
which "[m]en and women of good conscience can disagree"zs but 
on which these good people should obligingly put their differences 
aside once the Court has spoken, and accept the Court's decree. 
The Court's "promise of constancy" must be kept for the sake of 
keeping faith with those who have been "tested by following" a con-
troversial decision.26 The people must accept the will of the Justices 
because "the character of a Nation of people who aspire to live ac-
cording to the rule of law" is inseparable from their acceptance of 
the decisions of "the Court invested with the authority to ... speak 
before all others for their constitutional ideals. "27 
Putting aside the Court's pretentious rhetoric, there are at least 
three fundamental problems with the vision of judicial-political le-
gitimacy reflected in these passages-criticisms equally applicable 
to Burt's thesis. 
First, it is wrong in principle. The legitimacy of the Supreme 
Court in our constitutional system rests not on its ability to fashion 
social and political compromises but on its ability to render deci-
21. Id. at 2815. 
22. Id. at 2815. 
23. Id. at 2810. See also id. at 2816 ("We conclude that the basic decision in Roe was 
based on a constitutional analysis which we cannot now repudiate.") (emphasis added). 
24. Id. at 2884 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2883: "I cannot agree with, 
indeed I am appalled by, the Court's suggestion that the decision whether to stand by an 
erroneous constitutional decision must be strongly influenced--against overruling, no less-
by the substantial and continuing public opposition the decision has generated." 
25. 112 S. Ct. at 2806. See also id. at 2807 ("As with abortion, reasonable people will 
have differences of opinion about [contraception]."). 
26. Id. at 2815. 
27. Id. at 2816. 
230 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:221 
sions that the public readily can recognize as straightforward inter-
pretations of a constitutional or statutory text. The Court's 
legitimacy rests on its ability to render non-politicallegal judgment 
in accordance with principles of interpretation that stand outside 
the judges' personal sense of what is expedient, practical or desira-
ble as a policy matter. That is why Roe (and now Casey) strikes so 
deeply at the heart of the Court's legitimacy: it is perceived, rightly, 
as pure judicial fiat having no basis in constitutional text or 
history.2s 
True, political opposition to Roe flows primarily from its pol-
icy result. But unlike other socially explosive decisions (like Brown 
v. Board of Education), opposition to the abortion decisions cannot 
be met with the rejoinder that the words of the Constitution require 
such a result, for they plainly do not. (Defenders of Brown could 
properly point straight to the words "equal protection of the laws.") 
In this respect, Casey's legitimacy (or lack thereof) is completely 
dependent on Roe's. Adherence to precedent may provide the for-
mal trapping of legitimacy, but not its substance. If the precedent 
decision is fundamentally illegitimate, no amount of discussion of 
stare decisis can supply the defect; the doctrine of stare decisis be-
comes an excuse for repeating error. And where stare decisis is de-
fended solely in terms of the need to preserve the perception of 
legitimacy so that the Court may maintain its institutional power, 
one may fairly wonder whether the doctrine is empty and circular. 
Casey reveals just how far the Court has strayed from the grounds 
on which its legitimacy depends. 
Casey's second fundamental problem is the notion that the 
Court can successfully defuse controversy in general and the abor-
tion controversy in particular by fashioning astute and expedient 
"compromises" (all the while denying doing so). This is embarrass-
ingly naive. Historically, as Burt notes, the Court has been more of 
a provocateur than peacemaker, its supposed "compromises" fre-
quently exacerbating social strife-Dred Scott, Lochner and Plessy 
leap to mind, along with Roe. The problem is not that the Court 
has done a poor job of peacemaking but that it invariably will per-
form poorly a task that is not its job and for which it is not particu-
larly well suited. The attempted practice of judicial statesmanship 
collapses into judicial authoritarianism, as the Court seeks to en-
force as law the terms of the "compromise" it has imposed, in the 
28. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 
82 Yale L.J. 920, 935-37 (1973). I have developed this point at length elsewhere. See 
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Accusing Justice: Some Variations on the Themes of Roben M 
Cover's Justice Accused, 7 J. Law & Religion 33, 68-72 (1989). 
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face of resistance by one or both of the parties. Politically sensitive 
judging does not avoid the need to hand down an Order of the 
Court; it merely relocates the decree to a position the Justices per-
ceive (often incorrectly) to be more politically acceptable. 
Such a relocation is always away from principle-away from 
what an unvarnished legal analysis would produce. The idea that 
the Court will gain more popular respect by searching for the "suffi-
ciently plausible to be accepted," half-principled-half-political solu-
tion than by being principled is highly dubious. Even where the 
result is politically popular, the very act of judicial compromise 
compromises the judiciary's authority and legitimacy by rendering 
its decisions that of a transparently political body. The parties and 
the public are not fooled, and the Court's decisions become less au-
thoritative in the eyes of the People, not more so. One consequence 
of Casey is likely to be-and should be-the de-legitimation of the 
present Supreme Court. 
The third problem has to do with the nature of Roe as being a 
"watershed" decision. The idea that the more extraordinary the 
precedent-the more remote its connection to constitutional text, 
the more severe its departure from tradition and the more wrench-
ing its social and moral consequences-the less it should be subject 
to reconsideration, is strange indeed. It is the Big Lie theory ap-
plied to judicial decisionmaking: the bigger and more outrageous 
the lie, the more likely it is to be believed. If the Court is going to 
depart from text, history and precedent, it should make a really co-
lossal departure and proclaim it with gusto. (That's what makes it a 
"watershed," after all.) Future Courts will then feel obliged to "re-
main steadfast"29 to the watershed for the sake of preserving the 
appearance that the judiciary is governed by the rule of law. The 
logic of the "watershed" argument would suggest that economic 
substantive due process and the lawfulness of segregation-the 
Lochner and Plessy watersheds-should have been preserved. 
One would think that the Court's legitimacy might have been 
enhanced by overruling Roe, as it was by overruling Plessy. Indeed, 
before Casey was handed down, it might have been guessed that 
there could be as many as seven votes to overrule Roe-O'Connor, 
Kennedy and Souter joining the four dissenters. An opinion written 
by O'Connor, the first woman Justice and one who had publicly 
anguished over Roe, for a solid majority of seven, and adopting the 
same high-church tone as Casey, might well have been "perceived" 
as more legitimate than the deeply and bitterly divided Casey deci-
sion. Moreover, if the result proved contrary to public opinion, that 
29. 112 S. Ct. at 2815. 
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outcome would be susceptible to popular revision, since overruling 
Roe would merely have returned the issue to the democratic pro-
cess. The Supreme Court would not have been the focus of contin-
ued controversy. 
Why did not O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter choose this 
course, which would seem equally as politically astute? There are 
three possible explanations, none of which is very flattering to those 
three Justices. The first possibility is that these three now support a 
broad right to abortion as a matter of substantive constitutional 
law-a switch of positions by Kennedy and O'Connor-and that 
their rhetoric about the Court's legitimacy merely provides political 
and intellectual cover for their present positions. The second possi-
ble explanation is more disturbing-that these Justices genuinely 
view the craft of judging as one of divining that which will prove a 
balance "accepted by the Nation" and then seeking a "sufficiently 
plausible" legal justification for that outcome. Professor Burt could 
not have said it half as well.Jo If this is the explanation, Casey is a 
jurisprudential watershed in its own right, proclaiming an era of 
Burt-like social-psychological-political constitutional judging. 
The third possible explanation is perhaps the most disturbing 
of all, and probably the most likely. O'Connor, Kennedy and Sou-
ter were concerned first and foremost not to be seen as paying off 
the pro-life political movement for their nominations as Justices, 
even if they were persuaded that Roe was bad law and otherwise 
would be inclined to overrule it. In an atmosphere poisoned by bit-
ter confirmation disputes centering on the issue of abortion, by 
30. Professor Burt's own position on abortion is incoherent: He believes the Court was 
wrong to impose an answer to the abortion controversy in Roe, but only because such inter-
vention was not necessary to insure that the issue would remain "avidly controverted." 
Nonetheless, the "subjugative impositions" of the abortion controversy (Burt means state 
regulation of women's rights to abort their unborn children; he does not appear to consider 
the possible "subjugative imposition" on the child) mean that some sort of substantial abor-
tion right must be protected. The right he would create is plenary but patchwork: states 
would be free to regulate and prohibit abortions, but only if enough states adopt "free-choice 
statutes" and women residing in the other states live within reasonable travel distance of 
those states. Residency restrictions would be unconstitutional and states would be required 
(apparently as a matter of constitutional law) to provide financial assistance to overcome the 
financial burdens on women travelling from other states to obtain abortions. (It is not at all 
clear that Burt's "compromise" is any less abortion-on-demand than Roe or Casey. It cer-
tainly has no firmer basis in the Constitution.) 
On the issue of stare decisis, however, Burt comes down remarkably close to Casey: 
Even if the Court was wrong in the first instance, it "would [not] be justified in simply over-
ruling Roe" twenty years later. "The Court drew the lines of polarized confrontation and 
cannot now walk away from this subjugative conflict that it, more than any other institution, 
was instrumental in defining as such." However, Burt held little hope that the Court "might 
work to redefine the abortion controversy away from this subjugative ethos and toward the 
equality ideal," predicting instead that Roe would soon be reversed "and in its place, so far as 
this Court is concerned, force will rule." 
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protestors on both sides besieging the Court's grounds and by hys-
terical media attention, O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter were con-
cerned that no one have the impression that they had been 
"bought" -that they had given secret commitments on abortion as 
the price for a seat on the Supreme Court. They were not so much 
concerned with the Court's legitimacy but with perceptions of their 
own individual legitimacy. Whatever views they might have had on 
abortion and Roe were subordinated to this primary, personal con-
cern. There is evidence for this explanation in the opinion itself: 
the first paragraph's reference to the executive branch's repeated 
requests over the past decade that the Court reconsider Roe;Jt the 
exalted tone; the extended discussion of stare decisis and the Court's 
legitimacy; yet the unwillingness to embrace Roe as correct in prin-
ciple (and occasional hints that at least some thought it wrong in 
principle).32 
The third explanation combines the worst aspects of the other 
two. Not only is the Casey rhetoric a cover for a switch in posi-
tions, it is a cover for a switch the Justices do not even believe in 
themselves. And even if Casey was a case-specific personal declara-
tion of independence, the Justices making it will feel the need to 
adhere to the Burt-like jurisprudential principles stated there. It 
would be sadly ironic if what Professor Burt has urged out of a 
naive and misguided sense of judicial statesmanship has become law 
out of the basest and most personal of motives-the concern of indi-
vidual Justices for their own prestige, power and public image. 
It is doubtful that even those who are cheered by the result in 
Casey respect the Court's reasoning. The concern for image and for 
the politically expedient, and the lack of concern for principled legal 
analysis, should be deeply troubling to everyone, regardless of their 
political views on abortion. The same is true of Burt's thesis. In its 
acutely self-conscious (and self-important) conception of the judi-
cial role, in its arrogance about its own wisdom and in its naivete 
and presumptuousness in purporting permanently to "settle" a divi-
sive political and moral issue by constituting itself as a national 
abortion-law mediation panel, the Court's Casey decision illustrates 
(far better than Burt's book) the hazards of Professor Burt's method 
in practical operation. Casey shows that the Justices will tend to 
use that method to fashion Grand Compromises not for lofty pur-
poses of public peace, but for baser motives of seeking to preserve 
positive public perceptions of the Justices themselves. 
31. 112 S. Ct. at 2803. 
32. ld. at 2810, 2816. 
234 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 10:221 
III 
There is no necessary connection between Burt's actual theme 
of judicial mediation and the book's advertised theme of a challenge 
to the idea of judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation. 
One might favor a mediator's role as the appropriate manner in 
which "supreme" interpretive power should be exercised. But one 
might also favor such a role out of the perceived need to accommo-
date other branches that share interpretive power on an equal basis. 
Burt seems to shade toward the latter view, but his discussion waf-
fles foggily between the two, never clearly coming to rest on either 
of them. 
One wonders what would have been the result had the book 
seriously and systematically explored the thesis that the Supreme 
Court is not the supreme, or even final, interpreter of the Constitu-
tion, but must share that power with other actors in our constitu-
tional system-the President, the Congress, the states. How might 
such a reading affect our understanding of the Supreme Court's role 
in our constitutional system? How might it affect our understand-
ing of the power of the Court to "say what the law is" in relation to 
the other branches? In short, one wonders what might have been 
the result had Burt written the book advertised by the dust cover. 
The raw materials for such a study are present in the same 
legal history that makes up Burt's discussion in The Constitution in 
Conflict: John Marshall's argument for judicial review in Marbury 
v. Madison; Andrew Jackson's presidential dissent to the Marshall 
Court's holding in the Bank controversy; Abraham Lincoln's resist-
ance to the Taney Court's ruling in Dred Scott; the Court's 
landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education and state govern-
ment resistance to the post-Brown desegregation decrees, exempli-
fied in the Little Rock situation and culminating in Cooper v. Aaron; 
the Nixon Tapes case; the ongoing dispute over abortion. 
Burt begins by noting, accurately, that John Marshall's justifi-
cation for judicial review in Marbury "carefully avoided any claim 
for judicial supremacy." But the discussion quickly degenerates 
into the sentimental and speculative as Burt makes the historically 
unsupportable claim that Marshall was simply trying to engage Jef-
ferson in a constructive dialogue.33 He never returns to any system-
33. According to Burt, John Marshall was claiming that judges "were an appropriate 
instrumentality for this protective, conflict-transcending, and therefore unifying purpose for 
the law" and was "in effect asking Jefferson to transcend the divisive politics of 'the contest of 
opinion through which we have passed' and to give content to the unifying terms of his 
inaugural address, that the defeated 'minority possess their equal rights, which equal law 
must protect.' " It is hard to imagine that anyone familiar with the historical circums~ces 
of the Marbury case and the Republican-Federalist acrimony of the era could take senously 
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atic discussion of the supremacy versus coordinacy issue. 
Suppose, however, that Marbury is read-as it fairly can be 
read-as embracing only a co-equal, coordinate power of judicial 
interpretation, founded on the ideas of separation-of-powers and the 
independence of the judge's oath, and not as proclaiming judicial 
preeminence in legal interpretation. Marbury's separation-of-pow-
ers argument is, in a nutshell, that the structure of the Constitution, 
and the political theory of written constitutions generally, requires 
that the judges be free to interpret the law independently of the 
views of Congress. To hold that one branch's (the court's) interpre-
tation is controlled by another's (Congress's) is to bestow a "practi-
cal and real omnipotence" on the controlling branch.34 But this 
argument suggests not that the judicial branch is the supreme inter-
preter, but that each branch has a power of legal review over the 
determinations of the others.Js Similarly, Marbury's argument 
from the oath requirement of Article VI-that judges would violate 
their oaths if they were forced to acquiesce in a violation of the 
Constitution by deferring to the views of another branchJ6,_with 
equal ease can be turned into an argument against judicial 
supremacy. The President, members of Congress and even the ex-
ecutive, legislative and judicial officers of the states, swear an oath 
to uphold the Constitution. 
Taken seriously, this reading of Marbury has rather sweeping 
and startling implications. Do Congress and the President therefore 
have the prerogative to disregard (to "overrule"?) Supreme Court 
decisions with which they disagree when considering legislation? 
Does the President have the power to refuse to enforce Supreme 
Court judgments that he believes are legally improper? Is a state 
governor bound by his oath to resist by every means possible judi-
cial decrees that he conscientiously believes are based on unfaithful 
interpretations of the Constitution? 
Each of these questions corresponds to an actual historical 
event. Jackson's veto of the Bank bill was premised on the idea that 
"[e]ach public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution 
the suggestion that Marshall's Marbury opinion was the act of a Great Conciliator intent on 
engaging Jefferson in dialogue and constructive criticism. See generally James M. O'Fallon, 
''Marbury", 44 Stan. L. Rev. 219 (1992); William W. Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Mar-
bury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. I (1969). 
34. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 178 (1803). 
35. See Alexander Bickel The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar 
of Politics 3-4 (2d ed. 1986); cf. Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 905, 919-22 (1990). 
36. The Court characterizes such a requirement of deference, against one's own consci-
entious judgment as to what the Constitution requires, as "immoral," "worse than solemn 
mockery" and even "a crime." 5 U.S. (I Cranch) at 180. 
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swears that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is 
understood by others." Thus, the "opinion of the judges has no 
more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has 
over the judges, and on that point the President is independent of 
both."37 As a Senate candidate in 1858, Lincoln declared his oppo-
sition to Dred Scott and his refusal to be bound by it as a legislator; 
the decision was not binding "as a political rule" preventing Con-
gress or the President from "resisting it" by passing legislation in-
consistent with it. As President, Lincoln defied Chief Justice 
Taney's order declaring unconstitutional Lincoln's suspension of 
the writ of habeas corpus at the outbreak of civil insurrection in 
Baltimore in April 1861. Lincoln directed subordinate executive of-
ficers to ignore Taney's order in Ex Parte Merryman, either because 
Lincoln believed that Taney was wrong on the merits of the precise 
constitutional issue presented or because Lincoln interpreted the 
Constitution to justify otherwise unconstitutional actions when nec-
essary to suppress insurrection threatening the maintenance of the 
constitutional union.3s 
Modern constitutional conflicts raise many of the same issues. 
Richard Nixon complied with the Court's decision in United States 
v. Nixon, but he had made noises about refusing to do so. Had he 
been convinced of the legal correctness of his claim of executive 
privilege, should he not have refused to produce the tapes? Would 
Arkansas Governor Faubus have been within his constitutional pre-
rogative (if still morally and legally wrong) in resisting desegrega-
tion in Little Rock if he conscientiously believed that the Brown 
decision was unlawful? Could an anti-abortion President legiti-
mately announce that Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey were wrongly decided, and that the executive branch would 
take no action to enforce any injunction issued by a federal court 
against state abortion legislation? 
Are there principled distinctions among these various situa-
tions, or must we choose between judicial supremacy and radical 
decentralization? If so, is it so clear which alternative is to be pre-
ferred? Which one is more consistent with the original understand-
ing and design of the Constitution? Burt asks none of these 
37. Veto Message, July 10, 1832 3 Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1139, 1145 
(Bureau of Nat'l Literature, 1897). 
38. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (D. Md. 1861) (Taney, C.J., Circuit Justice). 
See James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom 261-62, 286-87 (Oxford U. Press, 1988). 
Curiously, Burt says nothing about this singular and jurisprudentially very important inci-
dent of a President's refusal to honor a judicial decree directed against him personally. For a 
discussion of Merryman and its implications, see Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Merryman 
Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation,- Cardozo L. Rev. 
- (1993) (symposium issue) (forthcoming). 
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questions, the discussion of which would have made a far more in-
teresting book-and one better suited to its title-than The Consti-
tution in Conflict turned out to be. Asking these questions might 
also have shed light on the question with which Burt is most con-
cerned: how is the judiciary's interpretive power to be exercised? 
The shared power view offers at least two limited insights on this 
question. 
First, if the power of constitutional interpretation is viewed as 
shared, rather than the Court's exclusive prerogative, there would 
seem less warrant for the Court taking itself and perceptions of its 
institutional integrity quite so seriously, (as it did in Casey, for ex-
ample). If those in other branches are not, in fact, required to ac-
quiesce in the Court's constitutional judgments, then there is no 
need to adhere to precedents out of an overwrought sense of obliga-
tion-a "promise of constancy,"39 a commitment "to remain 
steadfast, lest in the end a price be paid for nothing"40-to those in 
other branches who will be "tested by following" the Court.41 Nor 
must precedents be followed on the ground that the Nation's "very 
ability to see itself through its constitutional ideals" is bound up in 
devotion to a Court "invested with the authority to ... speak before 
all others for their constitutional ideals. "42 Perhaps the legitimacy 
of the Court depends on a fairly high doctrine of judicial inerrancy 
if the underlying premise is one of judicial supremacy. But if the 
premise is one of co-equal authority and interpretive tension among 
the branches with the political branches regarded as playing an 
equal role, the legitimacy of the system is not dependent on whether 
the Nation accepts as indisputably correct the views of any one in-
stitution within that system.43 
Second, at the same time that a shared power model might sug-
gest that the Court take itselfless seriously, it might suggest that the 
Court not act so politically. That role-the tempering of principle 
with pragmatism-can be expected to be performed all too aggres-
sively by the political branches. It does not follow from the premise 
of shared power that the Court should modulate its decisions to 
take into account political realities, either to effect compromise or 
39. 112 S. Ct. at 2815. 
40. ld. 
41. ld. 
42. ld. at 2816. See also id. at 2814 ("The root of American governmental power is 
revealed most clearly in the instance of the power conferred by the Constitution upon the 
Judiciary of the United States and specifically upon this Court."). 
43. Again, contrast the (inconsistent) words of Casey: "[T]he justification claimed 
must be beyond dispute . ... [T]he Court's legitimacy depends on making legally principled 
decisions ... sufficiently plausible to be accepted by the Nation." 112 S. Ct. at 2814 (empha-
sis added). 
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to avoid rendering decisions that will likely bring the Court into 
conflict with the President, the Congress, the states or the people. 
On the contrary, to do so would be to compromise away in advance 
the one contribution it can best make to government: the integrity 
of its judgments. The actual "final" constitutional resolution of an 
issue will be determined by the extent to which the executive, the 
Congress, the states and the people agree or disagree with the 
Court's interpretation and translate that constitutional judgment 
into limitations on or refinements of the Court's ruling. But that 
resolution is a matter properly out of the Court's control and, 
strictly speaking, should be none of its concern. The Justices 
should-indeed, because of their oaths, must-state what they be-
lieve is a proper interpretation of the law, irrespective of political 
consequences, public perceptions or concern for their own power. 
The Constitution in Conflict implicitly rejects such a view of the 
Court's role in favor of a more self-consciously political role. That 
Professor Burt has taken this position is not of enormous moment. 
That the Supreme Court has made considerations of power and 
politics the centerpiece of its new jurisprudence of "reasoned judg-
ment" is of far greater cause for concern. 
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In this small volume James Ely puts forth a careful, wide-rang-
ing and blessedly terse survey of the constitutional treatment of 
property rights over the course of American history. This is not a 
book of constitutional theory, nor is it a book on the theory of prop-
erty rights; and although the author makes a number of interesting 
and informed judgments about the legal events he describes, he does 
not give the reader many explicit clues about the theoretical stance 
from which these comments emerge. Extrapolating from the text 
itself, Ely seems to be working from the perspective of ordinary lan-
guage or ordinary understanding. That is, he appears to be asking 
what most people mean by "property," and then describing the 
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